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I.

DIFFERENT “UNDUE HARDSHIP” STANDARDS
A. THE BRUNNER TEST

Nine circuits currently use the Brunner Test to evaluate student debt in bankruptcy
cases. 6 The Brunner Test was established by the Second Circuit in Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corporation. 7 In order to satisfy the Brunner Test, a debtor must
show that (1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal"
standard of living if forced to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that
this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 8 This inquiry is
highly fact sensitive and “has a reputation for being harsh on debtors . . . .” 9
i.

“Minimal Standard of Living” under the Brunner Test

The first prong of the test, namely determining a “minimal standard of living,” is
inherently subjective. Some courts situated in the Fifth Circuit have used the federal poverty
guideline as “a useful yardstick for determining what is a minimal standard of living.” 10
However, using the poverty guideline for determining a “minimal standard of living” is an
outlier standard. 11

6
See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)); In re Faish, 72 F.3d 298
(3d Cir. 1995); In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 2005); In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 2003);
In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005); Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Pena, 155 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Cox,
338 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2003).
7
See Brunner, 831 F.2d 395.
8
See id.
9
See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 399.
10
Justice v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Justice), No. 14-13684-JDW, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4100, at 9 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. Nov. 28, 2016); see also Knox v. Sallie Mae (In re Knox), No. 0506951EE, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3873, at
5 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2007).
11
See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating
debtors “need not live in abject poverty before a discharge is forthcoming”); see also O'Donohoe v. Panhandle-
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Other courts use the more complicated “means test tables” in order to determine a
“minimal standard of living.” 12 The means test tables is “a mechanical test, based only
superficially on a debtor's reality, the purpose of which is to create a bright line presumptive test
of eligibility.” 13 In In re Demmons, the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana
used the means test tables to show that “the means test tables for Louisiana debtors would allow
[the debtors] $3,095 per month for housing, utilities, transportation, health care and a living
allowance . . . .” The court concluded that the “debtors are nowhere near spending that amount of
money per month.” 14
It is clear, that an analysis under the first prong of the Brunner test is dependent on the
court in which a debtor seeks discharge due to the varying approaches courts take for
determining “minimal standard of living.” One recent example of a court’s creativity under this
first prong is Hutsell v. Navient (In re Hutsell), where a bankruptcy court in the Northern District
of Ohio determined that payments made by the debtor’s parents to supplement the debtor’s
income were “noncompulsory charity.” 15 Therefore, the court excluded these funds from the
“minimal standard of living” analysis. 16
ii.

“Undue Hardship” According to the Brunner Test

The heart of the Brunner Test lies in the second prong, namely a plaintiff-debtor
establishing that the “undue hardship” is likely to persist. A finding under this prong, like the
first prong, will be dependent on the circuit in which the debtor files. The majority approach is

Plains Higher Educ. Auth. (In re O'Donohoe), No. 12-33870, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June
13, 2013).
12
See Demmons v. R3 Educ., Inc. (In re Demmons), Nos. 14-11638, 15-1024, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3659, at 18
(Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016).
13
In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
14
See In re Demmons, No. 14-11638, 2016 WL 5874831, at *4.
15
See In re Hutsell, 620 B.R. 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2020).
16
See id.
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the “certainty of hopelessness” standard. 17 Under this standard, the inquiry is not “merely a
present inability to fulfill financial commitment,” but rather the “circumstances must be
indicative of a certainty of hopelessness . . .” that a debtor’s state of financial affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period. 18 For this reason, many discharges
under the “certainty of hopelessness” standard involve debtors with some kind of medical
condition. 19
Some courts have found the “certainty of hopelessness” standard too rigorous. 20 Some
courts have determined that in “applying [the second] prong, courts need not require a ‘certainty
of hopelessness’” and thus take “a realistic look . . . into [a] debtor’s circumstances and the
debtor’s ability to provide for adequate shelter, nutrition, health care, and the like.” 21 Courts that
do not use the “certainty of hopelessness” standard use different inquiries in order to determine
“undue hardship.” Recently, the Fifth Circuit used the “intolerable difficulty” standard to
determine that the debtor’s situation would not persist and held that “student loans are not to be
discharged unless requiring repayment would impose intolerable difficulties on the debtor.” 22
Other courts have used an “unlikely” standard. A bankruptcy court in the Northern District of
Iowa found that “it is unlikely that Debtor’s financial resources will improve in the future.” 23
Finally, in proving “undue hardship,” certain circuits, like the Eleventh Circuit, require
expert testimony to supplement a debtor’s claim of continued incapacity. 24 However, the

See Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2013).
See Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005).
19
See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he crucial requirement is that the debtor show how
his medical conditions prevent him from working. . ..”); see also In re Davis, 373 B.R. 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)
(rejecting undue hardship claim based on debtor's alleged depression where debtor admitted that her ailment “never
caused her to lose a job or miss an interview or employment opportunity”).
20
See generally Krieger, 713 F.3d at 884–85.
21
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004).
22
Thomas v. Dep't of Educ. (In re Thomas) 931 F.3d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 2019).
23
Fern v. FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 553 B.R. 362, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2016).
24
See CMC v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007).
17
18
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majority approach views expert testimony as an extraneous requirement that would unnecessarily
raise costs for a debtor seeking discharge. 25
iii.

“Good Faith Efforts to Repay” Under the Brunner Test

The third and final prong of the Brunner Test is whether the debtor has made good faith
efforts to repay the loans. In other words, “good faith efforts” are the debtor’s “‘efforts to obtain
employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses.”’ 26 This requirement also means that
the “undue hardship” the debtor is facing must have been caused by factors beyond the debtor’s
control. 27
Certain circuits impose more rigorous analysis than others. For instance, the Fourth
Circuit found the debtors failed the third prong of the Brunner Test where “the payments the
[debtors] made on their student loans are insufficient to demonstrate good faith because they
failed to make payments on their student loans during a time period when their income
substantially exceeded their necessary expenses.” 28
However, other courts take a less rigid approach to this third prong. The Brunner court
itself found that this third prong was satisfied even when the discharge proceeding was only
seven months after the debtor was out of school and occurred within a month of when mandatory
payments were set to start. 29 Recently, in Hutsell v. Navient, the bankruptcy court for the
Northern District of Ohio explained that “good faith ‘is essentially an inquiry into whether the
See In re O'Donohoe, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 11 (citing Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett),
487 F.3d 353, 359–60 (6th Cir. 2007)) ("[A] debtor is not required to present expert testimony to corroborate his
own testimony about his health."); see also In re White, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4617, at 14.
26
In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting O'Hearn v. Educ. Credit Management Corp., 339 F.3d
559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Hedlund v. Educational Resources Institute, Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir.
2013).
27
See In re Hutsell, 620 B.R. 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2020).
28
In re Mosko, 515 F.3d at 326; see also In re Fields, 286 Fed. Appx. 246, 250 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting undue
hardship claim because debtor's failure to make payments did not result from factors beyond her control); In re
McNemar, 352 B.R. 621, 624 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006) (rejecting undue hardship claim because of debtor's
voluntary cessation of payments on loan).
29
See In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
25
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debtor has consciously or irresponsibly disregarded his or her repayment obligation – or, instead,
whether there is some justification for the debtor’s default and ongoing inability to repay the
loan.’” 30 The Hutsell court determined that the good faith requirement was satisfied even after
assuming that the debtor made no efforts to repay the loan and after “a family member had
offered to repay [the debtor’s] loans in a lump sum . . . but Plaintiff was unable to determine how
much she owed and where to send payments.” 31 “[N]either of these facts [were] dispositive” due
to the debtor’s litany of health issues and the amount of debt she owed, which was less than
$30,000. 32 Like the previous prongs, the third prong of the Brunner Test will largely depend on
the circuit and district in which a debtor files, and sufficient “good faith efforts” will vary
depending on the circuit.
B. THE “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES” TEST

The First and Eighth Circuits use the “Totality of the Circumstances” Test for
discharging student loans. 33 This standard is best explicated in the Eighth Circuit’s decision to
adopt the “Totality of the Circumstances” standard. 34 This test focuses on determining whether a
debtor’s reasonable future financial resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan
debt, while also allowing for a minimal standard of living. 35 The main analysis for this test is
“(1) the debtor's past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation
of the debtor's and her dependent's reasonably necessary living expenses; and (3) any other
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.” 36 Furthermore,

Hutsell, 620 B.R. at 604 (quoting Trudel v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Trudell), 514 B.R. 219, 228–29 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2014).
31
Hutsell at 604.
32
See id.
33
See In re Bronsdon, 435 B.R. 791, 800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).
34
See Long v. Educational Credit Management Corporation (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
35
See id.
36
In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554.
30
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“this determination will require a special consideration of the debtor's present employment and
financial situation - including assets, expenses, and earnings - along with the prospect of future
changes - positive or adverse - in the debtor's financial position.” 37 Thus, while the totality of the
circumstances analysis has some overlapping considerations with the Brunner Test, this minority
approach is more fact-intensive than the Brunner Test. Under the totality of the circumstances
test, a judge is encouraged to “consider all relevant facts and circumstances of a particular
case.” 38
II.

VARIOUS FORMS OF DISCHARGE
Another consideration for a bankruptcy judge is the discharge options available to a

debtor. Typically, after a finding of “undue hardship,” the result will be the discharge of the
debtor’s entire student debt. In limited circumstances, a bankruptcy court will partially discharge
a debtor’s student loan debt after a finding of “undue hardship.” 39 Some circuits go further and
find that a partial discharge can be granted even without a finding of “undue hardship.” 40 Finally,
some courts have granted a discharge of the debtor’s remaining balance after their participation
in an Income-Based Repayment Plan (“IBRP”). 41 In Erbschloe, a Chapter 7 debtor who was the
victim of a sexual assault, and who was not able to use her studio art degree because she suffered
from a “snapping scapula,” did not satisfy the second prong of the Brunner Test. The court held
that she was still responsible for $19,300 in student debt. 42 However, if after her participation in

Id. at 555; see also Murphy v. Educ. Credit Management Corp., 511 B.R. 1 (D. Mass. 2014).
Nash v. Connecticut Student Loan Foundation, 330 B.R. 323 (D. Mass. 2005).
39
See Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. BJR Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We hold
that a bankruptcy court may exercise its equitable authority to partially discharge student debt under the Bankruptcy
Code . . .” but “[o]nly the portion that results in undue hardship should be discharged.”).
40
See In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 439 (“In a student-loan discharge case where undue hardship does not exist, but
where facts and circumstances require intervention in the financial burden on the debtor, an all-or-nothing treatment
thwarts the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.”).
41
See Erbschloe v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Erbschloe), 502 B.R. 470, 483–85 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013).
42
See id.
37
38
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the IBRP she remained with student loan debt, then the balance remaining after the repayment
period was discharged under § 523(a)(8). 43
CONCLUSION
Discharge of a debtor’s student loan debt will depend on the debtor’s particular
circumstances (i.e., whether they are a sympathetic debtor), as well as the circuit in which the
debtor seeks their discharge. A majority of circuits use the Brunner Test, which asks three
questions to determine whether the debt should be discharged. A minority of circuits use the
Totality of Circumstances Test, which asks similar questions to the Brunner Test, but has proven
more favorable to debtors. Most discharge proceedings will result in the full discharge of the
debtor’s loan. However, a minority of courts will partially discharge (even without a finding of
“undue hardship”) a student loan debt, or alternatively, find creative ways to help the debtor such
as discharging the balance of a debtor’s loan after a period of repayment.
Student loan forgiveness has been a major topic of recent discussion within the legislative
branch. While more than eighty student loan forgiveness bills and legislation were introduced in
Congress’s 2019-2020 session, only two bills became law. 44 Thus, in conjunction with the
discharge available under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, a practitioner should
monitor student loan discharge legislation.

43

See id.
The first was Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (H.R. 133), which extends the tax-free status of employerpaid student loan repayment assistance programs by five years (until December 31, 2025). The second piece of
legislation was in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) (H.R. 748), which
provided for a student loan payment pause and interest waiver through September 30, 2020, on federal education
loans that are held by the U.S. Department of Education. This pause was extended by President Biden. See
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/pausing-federal-student-loan-payments/.

44
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